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Colour as a Secondary Quality' 
PAUL A. BOGHOSSIAN AND 
J. DAVID VEL LEMAN 
The Galilean Intuition 
Does modern science imply, contrary tothe testimony ofour eyes, that 
grass is not green? Galileo thought i did: 
Hence I think that hese tastes, odors, colors, etc., on the side of the object in 
which they seem to exist, are nothing else than mere names, but hold their 
residence solely in the sensitive body; so that if the animal were removed, every 
such quality would be abolished and annihilated. Nevertheless, a  soon as we 
have imposed names on them, particular nd different from those of the other 
primary and real accidents, we induce ourselves to believe that they also exist 
just as truly and really as the latter.2 
The question whether Galileo was right on this score is not really a
question about the content of modern scientific theory: aside from some 
difficulties concerning the interpretation of quantum echanics, we know 
what properties are attributed to objects by physics. The question israther 
about he correct understanding of colour concepts as they figure in visual 
experience: how do objects appear to be, when they appear to be green? 
Galileo seems to have found it very natural to say that the property an 
object appears to have, when it appears to have a certain colour, is an 
intrinsic qualitative property which, as science teaches us, it does not in 
fact possess. 
Subsequent philosophical theorizing about colour has tended to recoil 
from Galileo's semantic intuition and from its attendant ascription of 
massive error to ordinary experience and thought. Thus, in a recent paper 
Sydney Shoemaker has written: 
[S]ince in fact we apply color predicates tophysical objects and never to sensations, 
ideas, experiences, etc., the account of their semantics recommended bythe 
Principle of Charity is one that makes them truly applicable to tomatoes and 
lemons rather than to sense experiences thereof.3 
Should a principle of charity be applied in this way to the interpretation 
1 We have benefited from discussing the material in this paper with: Sydney Shoemaker, David 
Hills, Larry Sklar, Mark Johnston, and participants ina seminar that we taught at the University of 
Michigan in the fall of I987. Our research as been supported by Rackham Faculty Fellowships from 
the University of Michigan. 
2 Opere Complete di G. G., I5 vols, Firenze, I842, IV, p. 333 (as translated by E. A. Burtt in The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, Doubleday, Garden City, NY, l954, p. 85). 
3 Sydney Shoemaker, 'Qualities and Qualia: What's In The Mind?' (manuscript), p. 2. 
Mind, vol. xcviii, no. 389, January I989 ? Oxford University Press u989 
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of the colour concepts exercised in visual experience? We think not. We 
shall argue, for one thing, that the grounds for applying a principle of 
charity are lacking in the case of colour concepts. More importantly, we 
shall argue that attempts at giving the experience of colour a charitable 
interpretation either fail to respect obvious features of that experience or 
fail to interpret it charitably, after all. Charity to visual experience is 
therefore no motive for resisting the natural, Galilean response to a 
scientific understanding of light and vision. The best interpretation f
colour experience nds up convicting it of widespread and systematic 
error.4 
Charitable Accounts of Colour Experience 
According to the principle of charity, the properties that objects are seen 
as having, when they are seen as coloured, must be properties that they 
generally have when so perceived. Two familiar interpretations of visual 
experience satisfy this principle. 
The physicalist account 
The first of these interpretations begins with the assumption that what 
objects appear to have, when they look red, is the physical property that 
is normally detected or tracked by that experience. Since the physical 
property that normally causes an object to be seen as red is the property 
of having one out of a class of spectral-reflectance profiles-or one out of 
a class of molecular bases for such profiles-the upshot of the present 
interpretation is that seeing something as red is seeing it as reflecting 
4 One might be tempted to dissolve the conflict between the Galilean view and the charitable view 
of colour experience by rejecting a presupposition that. they share. Both sides of the conflict assume 
that the properties mentioned in our descriptions of visual experience are properties that such 
experience represents objects as having. The only disagreement is over the question whether the 
colour properties that are thus attributed to objects by visual experience are properties that the objects 
tend to have. One might claim, however, that visual experience does not attribute properties to objects 
at all; and one might bolster one's claim by appeal to a theory known as adverbialism. According to 
adverbialism, the experience of seeing a thing as red is an event modified by some adverbial property- 
say, a seeing event that proceeds red-thing-ly. Not all adherents of adverbialism are committed to 
denying that such an experience represents an object as having a property; but adverbialism would 
indeed be useful to one who wished to deny it. For adverbialism would enable one to say that the 
phrase 'seeing a thing as red' describes a seeing event as having some adverbial property rather than 
as having the content hat something is red. One could therefore contend that the question whether 
things really have the colour properties that they are seen as having is simply ill-formed, since colour 
properties figure in a visual experience as adverbial modifications ofthe experience rather than as 
properties attributed by the experience to an object. 
Our view is that this extreme version of adverbialism does unacceptable violence to the concept of 
visual experience. Seeing something as red is the sort of thing that can be illusory or veridical, hence 
the sort of thing that has truth-conditions, and hence the sort of thing that has content. The content 
of this experience is that the object in question is red; and so the experience represents an object as 
having a property, about which we can legitimately ask whether it is a property that objects so 
represented really tend to have. 
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incident light in one of such-and-such ways, or as having surface molecules 
with one of such-and-such electron configurations.5 
Now, we have no doubt that experiences of an object as having a 
particular colour are normally correlated with that object's possessing one 
of a class of spectral-reflectance profiles. But to concede the existence of 
such a correlation is not yet to concede that membership in a spectral- 
reflectance lass is the property that objects are seen as having when they 
are seen as having a particular colour. Indeed, the claim that visual 
experience has this content yields unacceptable consequences. 
In particular, this claim implies that one cannot tell just by looking at 
two objects whether they appear to have the same or different colours. 
For according to the physicalist interpretation, which colour one sees an 
object as having depends on which spectral-reflectance class one's visual 
experience represents the object as belonging to; and which spectral- 
reflectance class one's experience represents an object as belonging to 
depends on which spectral-reflectance profiles normally cause experiences 
of that sort. Hence in order to know whether two objects appear to have 
the same colour, under the physicalist interpretation, one must know 
whether one's experiences of them are such as result from similar spectral- 
reflectance profiles. And the latter question cannot be settled on the basis 
of the visual experiences alone: it calls for considerable empirical enquiry. 
The physicalist interpretation therefore implies that knowing whether two 
objects appear to have the same colour requires knowing the results of 
empirical enquiry into the physical causes of visual experiences. 
But surely, one can tell whether two objects appear similarly coloured 
on the basis of visual experience alone. To be sure, one's experience of 
the objects will not necessarily provide knowledge of the relation between 
their actual colours. But the physicalist account implies that visual 
experience of objects fails to provide epistemic access, not just to their 
actual colour similarities, but to their apparent colour similarities a well. 
And here the account must be mistaken. The apparent colours of objects 
can be compared without empirical enquiry into the physical causes of 
the objects' visual appearances; and so the properties that objects appear 
to have, when they appear coloured, cannot be identified with the physical 
properties that are detected or tracked by those appearances. 
Dispositionalist accounts 
We turn, then, to another class of theories that respect the principle of 
charity in application to colour experience. These theories are united 
I D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, I968; 
J. J. C. Smart, 'On Some Criticism of a Physicalist Theory of Colour', in Philosophical Aspects of the 
Mind-Body Problem, ed. Chung-yin-Chen, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, I975 (as cited by 
Christopher Peacocke, 'Colour Concepts and Colour Experience', Synthese, I984, pp. 365-8I, n. 5). 
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under the name of dispositionalism. All of them are based, in one way or 
another, on the claim that the concept of colour is such as to yield a priori 
truths of the following form: 
(i) x is red if and only if x appears red under standard conditions.6 
Different versions of dispositionalism interpret such biconditionals differ- 
ently and apply them to the vindication of colour experience in different 
ways. 
Applying the biconditionals: the direct approach 
Perhaps the most direct way to argue from the dispositionalist bicon- 
ditionals to the veridicality of colour experience is to point out that the 
biconditionals a sert, as a priori truths, that there are conditions under 
which things appear to have a colour if and only if they actually have it, 
and hence that there are conditions under which colour experience is 
veridical. The possibility of global error in colour experience is thus 
claimed to be excluded a priori by the very concept of colour. 
We think that this version of dispositionalism isappropriates whatever 
a priori truth there may be in the relevant biconditionals. We are prepared 
to admit that the concept of colour guarantees the existence of privileged 
conditions for viewing colours, conditions under which an observer's 
colour experiences or colour judgements are in some sense authoritative. 
But colour experiences and colour judgements may enjoy many different 
kinds of authority, some of which would not entail that objects have the 
properties that colour experience represents them as having. 
Even philosophers who regard colour experience as globally false, for 
example, will nevertheless want to say that some colour experiences are 
correct in the sense that they yield the colour attributions that are generally 
accepted for the purposes of describing objects in public discourse. Of 
course, such a claim will yield slightly different biconditionals, of the 
following form: 
(ii) x is to be described as red if and only if x appears red under 
standard conditions. 
Our point, however, is that (ii) may be the only biconditional that is 
strictly true, and that (i) may seem true only because it is mistaken for 
(ii). If biconditional (ii) expresses the only genuine a priori truth in the 
vicinity, then the authority of experiences produced under standard 
conditions may consist in no more than there being a convention of 
describing objects in terms of the colours attributed to them in such 
experiences. As we shall argue at the end of this paper, such a convention 
6 The final clause of this biconditional is often formulated so as to specify not only standard 
conditions but a standard observer as well. But the observer's being standard can itself be treated as 
a condition of observation; and so the distinction between observer and conditions is unnecessary. 
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may be perfectly justifiable even if all colour experience is, strictly speaking, 
false. Hence the intuitive support for biconditionals ike (i) may not be 
such as to ground a vindication of colour experience. 
In order for the dispositionalist biconditionals to vindicate colour 
experience, they must mean, not just that convention dictates describing 
objects in terms of the colours that they appear to have under standard 
conditions, but also that objects actually have the properties that they 
thereby appear to have. And we see no reason for regarding this stronger 
claim as an a priori truth. 
Applying the biconditionals a content-specifications 
Another way of arguing from dispositionalist biconditionals to the 
veridicality of colour experience is to interpret he biconditionals as 
specifying the content of that experience. This argument proceeds as 
follows. 
The first premiss of the argument says that the property that objects 
are represented as having when they look red is just this: a disposition to 
look red under standard conditions. The second premiss ays that many 
objects are in fact disposed to look red under standard conditions, and 
that these are the objects that are generally seen as red. These premisses 
yield the conclusion that the experience of red is generally veridical, since 
it represents an object as having a disposition that it probably has- 
namely, a disposition to look red under standard conditions. 
The first premiss of this argument corresponds to a biconditional of 
the following form: 
(iii) Red [i.e., the property that a disposition to appear 
objects are seen as having = def red under standard 
when they look red] conditions 
The right side of biconditional (iii) can be interpreted in two different 
ways, however; and so there are two different versions of the associated 
argument. 
Two versions of content-dispositionalism 
The first version of the argument interprets he phrase 'a disposition to 
look red' on the assumption that the embedded phrase 'to look red' has 
its usual semantic structure. The entire phrase is therefore taken to mean 
'a disposition to give the visual appearance of being red'.7 The second 
See John McDowell, 'Values and Secondary Qualities', in Morality and Objectivity; a Tribute to 
31 L. Mackie, ed. Ted Honderich, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, I985, pp. II0-29; David 
Wiggins, 'A Sensible Subjectivism?', inNeeds, Values, Truth, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, I987, pp. I85- 
214, p. I89; Gareth Evans, 'Things Without the Mind-A Commentary Upon Chapter Two of 
Strawson's Individuals', in Philosophical Subjects; Essays Presented to P. F. Strawson, ed. Zak van 
Straaten, Clarendon Press, Oxford, I980, pp. 76-Ii6, see pp. 94-I00, esp. n. 30. 
Wiggins and McDowell favour a similar strategy for vindicating our perceptions of other qualities 
such as the comic and perhaps even the good. See McDowell's Lindley Lecture, 'Projection and 
Truth in Ethics'. 
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version interprets he phrase on the assumption that 'to look red' has a 
somewhat unusual structure. The predicate following 'look' is interpreted 
as expressing, not a property that a thing is disposed to give the appearance 
of having, but rather an intrinsic property of the visual appearance that 
it is disposed to give. The phrase 'a disposition to look red' is therefore 
taken to mean something like 'a disposition to cause reddish visual 
appearances'.8 
Under these two interpretations, (iii) assigns two different contents to 
colour experience. Under one interpretation, the property that things are 
seen as having when they look red is defined as a disposition to give the 
visual appearance of being red; under the other, the property that things 
are seen as having is defined as a disposition to cause reddish visual 
appearances. In either case, the content of colour experience is claimed to 
be true, on the grounds that objects seen as red do have the appropriate 
disposition. 
We regard both versions of the argument as faulty. In the next section, 
we shall raise an objection that militates against both versions equally. In 
subsequent sections, we shall consider each version in its own right. 
A general problem in content-dispositionalism 
Both versions of the present argument are to be faulted, in our opinion, 
for misdescribing the experience of colour. In assigning colour experience 
a dispositionalist content, they get the content of that experience wrong. 
When one enters a dark room and switches on a light, the colours of 
surrounding objects look as if they have been revealed, not as if they have 
been activated. That is, the dispelling of darkness looks like the drawing 
of a curtain from the colours of objects no less than from the objects 
themselves. If colours looked like dispositions, however, then they would 
seem to come on when illuminated, just as a lamp comes on when its 
switch is flipped. Turning on the light would seem, simultaneously, like 
turning on the colours; or perhaps it would seem like waking up the 
colours, just as it is seen to startle the cat. Conversely, when the light was 
extinguished, the colours would not look as if they were being concealed 
or shrouded in the ensuing darkness: rather, they would look as if they 
were becoming dormant, like the cat returning to sleep. But colours do 
not look like that; or not, at least, to us. 
More seriously, both versions of (iii) also have trouble describing the 
way in which colours figure in particular experiences, uch as after-images. 
The colours that one sees when experiencing an after-image are precisely 
the qualities that one sees as belonging to external objects. When red spots 
float before one's eyes, one sees the same colour quality that fire-hydrants 
8 Peacocke, 'Color Concepts and Color Experience'. 
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and maraschino cherries normally appear to have.9 The problem is that 
dispositionalist accounts of colour experience must analyse the appearance 
of colour in after-images a the appearance of a disposition to look red 
under standard conditions; and after-images simply cannot appear to have 
such a dispositional property. 
This problem would not arise if after-images were full-blown illusions. 
That is, if seeing an after-image consisted in seeming to see a material 
object suspended in physical -space, then that object, though in fact 
illusory, could still appear to have the -same colour quality as any other 
material object. But after-images are not seen as material objects, any 
more than, say, a ringing in one's ears is heard as a real noise. The items 
involved in these experiences are not perceived as existing independently 
of being perceived. On the one hand, the after-image is seen as located 
before one's eyes, rather than in one's mind, where visual memories are 
seen; and the ringing is likewise heard as located in one's outer ear, rather 
than in the inner auditorium of verbal thought and musical memory. But 
on the other hand, one does not perceive these items as actually existing 
in the locations to which they are subjectively referred. The ringing is 
heard as overlaying a silence in one's ears, where there is audibly nothing 
to hear; and similarly, the after-image is seen as overlaying the thin air 
before one's eyes, where there is visibly nothing to see. The ringing is 
thus perceived as a figment or projection of one's ears, the image as a 
figment or projection of one's eyes: both, in short, are perceived as existing 
only in so far as one is perceiving them. 
Thus, the possibility of a red after-image r quires that one see something 
as simultaneously a figment of one's eyes and red. But how could something 
that looked like a figment of one's eyes also appear disposed to look a 
particular way under standard conditions? Because an after-image is seen 
as the sort of thing that exists only in so 'far as one is seeing it, it cannot 
be seen as the sort of thing that others could see nor, indeed, as the sort 
of thing that one could see again oneself, in the requisite sense. In seeing 
an after-image as a figment of one's eyes, one sees it as the sort of thing 
that will cease to exist when no longer seen and that will not be numerically 
identical to any future after-images, however similar they may be. One 
does not see it, in other words, as a persisting item that could be 
reintroduced into anyone's visual experience; and so one cannot see it as 
having a disposition to present his or any appearance ither to others or 
to oneself on other occasions. 
The foregoing, phenomenological problems are common to both versions 
9 Perhaps the best argument for this claim is that no one who can identify the colours of external 
objects needs to be taught how to identify the colours of after-images. Once a person can recognize 
fire hydrants and maraschino cherries as red, he can identify the colour of the spots that float before 
his eyes after the flash-bulb has fired. He does not need to be taught a second sense of 'red' for the 
purpose of describing the latter experience. 
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of the dispositionalist argument currently under consideration. Each 
version of the argument also has peculiar problems of its own, which we 
shall now consider in turn. We begin with the first version, which 
understands a disposition to look red as a disposition to give the visual 
appearance of having the property red. 
Problems in the first version of content-dispositionalism 
The problem with this version has to do with the property expressed by 
the word 'red' in the phrase 'a disposition to appear red under standard 
conditions'-the phrase constituting the right side of biconditional (iii). 
Keep in mind that the entire phrase has itself been offered as expressing 
the property that objects are seen as having when they look red. When 
things are seen as red, according to the present argument, what they are 
seen as having is a disposition to appear red under standard conditions. 
But does the word 'red' here express the same property that the entire 
phrase purports to express? 
Suppose that the answer to our question is no. In that case, what 
biconditional (iii) says is that the property that things are seen as having 
when they look red is a disposition to give the appearance of having some 
other property called red. This other property must naturally be a colour, 
since the property red could hardly be seen as a disposition to appear as 
having some property that was not a colour. For the sake of clarity, let 
us call this other property red*. 
Now, in order for objects to have the property red that they appear to 
have, under the present assumption, they must actually be disposed to 
give the appearance, under standard conditions, of having the property 
red*; and in order to have that disposition, they must actually give the 
appearance of having the property red* under standard conditions. Thus, 
if the property that things are seen as having when they look red is a 
disposition to appear red*, then the experience of seeing them as red is 
veridical, as the dispositionalist wishes to prove, only if they also appear 
red*. And the question then arises whether ed* is a property that things 
ever do or can actually have. The dispositionalist's argument does not 
show that the appearance of having red* is ever veridical, since that 
property is admitted to be different from the disposition whose existence 
the dispositionalist cites in vindicating the appearance of red. The 
consequence is that there must be colour experiences that the dispositional- 
ist has failed to vindicate. 
Suppose, then, that the dispositionalist answers yes to our question. 
That is, suppose he says that 'red' expresses the same property on the 
right side of (iii) as it does on the left. In that case, the dispositionalist's 
account of colour experience is circular, since in attempting to say what 
property things appear to have when they look red, he invokes the very 
property that is at issue. 
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The dispositionalist may refuse to be troubled by this circularity, 
however.10 He may point out that a circular account of a property can 
still be true, and indeed informative, despite its circularity. For instance, 
to define courage as a disposition to act courageously is to give a circular 
definition, a definition that cannot convey the concept of courage to anyone 
who does not already have it. Even so, courage is a disposition to act 
courageously, and this definition may reveal something important about 
the property-namely that it is a behavioural disposition. The disposi- 
tional ist about colour claims that the circularity inhis explication of red 
is similar. 
We grant that circularity alone does not necessarily undermine a
definitional equivalence. Yet the circularity in biconditional (iii) is 
significantly different from that in our circular definition of courage. Our 
definition of courage invokes courage in an ordinary extensional context, 
whereas the right side of (iii) invokes red in an intentional context 
expressing the content of a visual experience, an experience that happens 
to be the very one whose content (iii) purports to explicate. The result is 
that the visual experience of seeing something as red can satisfy (iii) only 
if it, too, is circular, and hence only if it is just as uninformative as (iii). 
Not only does (iii) fail to tell us which colour red is, then; it also precludes 
visual experience from telling us which colour an object has. The former 
failure may be harmless, but the latter is not. 
Let us illustrate the difference between an unproblematic circular 
definition and a problematic one by means of an analogy. Suppose that 
you ask someone who Sam is and are told, 'Sam is the father of Sam's 
children'. This answer does not tell you who Sam is if you do not already 
know. But it does tell you something about Sam-namely, that he has 
children-and, more importantly, it places Sam in a relation to himself 
that a person can indeed occupy. In order for Sam to satisfy this assertion, 
he need only be the father of his own children. Now suppose, alternatively, 
that your question receives the answer 'Sam is the father of Sam's father'. 
This response also identifies Sam by reference to Sam; but it has a more 
serious defect. Its defect is that it asserts of Sam that he stands to himself 
in a relation that is impossible for a person to occupy. 
These two circular identifications of Sam are analogous to the two 
circular definitions that we are considering. The definition of courage as 
a disposition to act courageously is uninformative, but it places courage 
in a relation to itself that a disposition can occupy. In order to satisfy this 
definition, courage must simply be the disposition to perform actions that 
tend to be performed by someone with that very disposition. By contrast, 
the dispositionalist about colour not only invokes the content of colour 
10 See McGinn, The Subjective View, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983, pp. 6-8; McDowell, 'Values 
and Secondary Qualities', n. 6; Wiggins, 'A Sensible Subjectivism?', p. I89; Michael Smith, 'Peacocke 
on Red and Red", Synthese, I986, pp. 559-76. 
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experience in explicating that content; he places that content in a relation 
to itself that is impossible for it to occupy. For his explication says that 
the content of the visual experience of red must contain, as a proper part, 
the content of the visual experience of red. To see something as red, 
according to (iii), is to have an experience whose content is that the thing 
is disposed to produce visual experiences with the content hat it is red. 
The experiential content hat something is red is thus embedded within 
itself, and this is a reflexive relation that no determinate content can 
occupy. Consequently, (iii) requires that the visual experience of red have 
an indeterminate content hat fails to represent its object as having any 
particular colour. 
Under the terms of (iii), an experience can represent its object as red 
only by representing it as disposed to produce visual experiences that 
represent it as red. The problem here is that the experiences that the 
object is thus represented as disposed to produce must themselves be 
represented as experiences that represent he object as red, rather than 
some other colour-lest the object be represented as disposed to appear 
something other than red. Yet these experiences can be represented as 
representing the object as red only if they are represented as representing 
it as disposed to produce experiences that represent it as red. And here 
the circle gets vicious. In order for an object to appear red rather than 
blue, it must appear disposed to appear red, rather than disposed to appear 
blue; and in order to appear disposed to appear red, rather than disposed 
to appear blue, it must appear disposed to appear disposed to appear red, 
rather than disposed to appear disposed to appear blue; and so on. Until 
this regress reaches an end, the object's appearance will not amount to 
the appearance of one colour rather than another. Unfortunately, the 
regress never reaches-an end. 
One might attempt to staunch the regress simply by invoking the 
relevant colour by name. 'To appear red', one might say, 'is to appear 
disposed to appear red-and that's the end of the matter.' 'Of course,' 
one might continue, 'if you don't already know what red is, then you 
haven't understood what I've said. But that doesn't impugn the truth of 
my assertion, nor its informativeness, since you have learned at least that 
the property things appear to have in appearing red is a disposition to 
produce appearances.' 
This reply cannot succeed. Staunching the regress with the word 'red' 
can work, but only if the word is not understood in the sense defined in 
biconditional (iii). We readily agree that red things do appear disposed to 
look red, and that they appear so without requiring the viewer to run an 
endless gamut of visual appearances. But what they appear disposed to 
do is to give the appearance of being red in a non-dispositional sense 
the appearance of having a non-dispositional redness. And the way they 
appear disposed to give that appearance is usually just by giving it-that 
Colour as a Secondary Quality 9I 
is, by looking non-dispositionally red.1" Similarly, objects can appear 
disposed to look square just by looking square, but only because they look 
square intrinsically and categorically. 
As we have seen, however, the dispositionalist cannot admit an intrinsic 
and categorical sense of the word 'red' into his formulation. For then he 
would have to acknowledge that objects appear disposed to look red, and 
do look red, in a non-dispositional sense. And he would then have 
acknowledged that an object's being disposed to look red does not 
guarantee that it is as it looks, in respect o colour, since the redness that 
it is thereby disposed to give the appearance of having is a different 
property from the disposition that it admittedly has. The dispositionalist 
must therefore say that although an object looks disposed to look red just 
by looking red, this looking red does not involve looking anything except 
disposed to look red. In short, the object must look disposed to look a 
particular way without there being any particular way that it looks, or looks 
disposed to look, other than so disposed. And that is why the vicious regress 
gets started. 
Note, once again, that the problem created by the regress is not that 
we are unable to learn what red is from the statement hat red is a 
disposition to look red. The problem is that, under the terms of that 
statement, the subject of visual experience cannot see what colour an 
object has. For he cannot see the particular colour of an object except by 
seeing the particular way the object tends to appear; and he cannot see 
the way it tends to appear except by seeing the way it tends to appear as 
tending to appear; and so on, ad infinitum. To be sure, a person can see 
all of these things if he can just see the object as having a colour, to begin 
with; but under the terms of dispositionalism, hecannot begin to see the 
object as having a colour except by seeing these dispositions; and so he 
can never -begin to see it as having a colour at all.12 
The second version of content-dispositionalism 
The only way to save dispositionalism from its fatal circularity is to ensure 
that the disposition with which a colour property is identified is not a 
disposition to give the appearance of having that very property. Christopher 
Peacocke has attempted to modify dispositionalism in just this way. 
According to Peacocke, the property that an object is seen as having 
II See McDowell, 'Values and Secondary Qualities', p. II2: 'What would one expect it to be like 
to experience something's being such as to look red, if not to experience the thing in question (in the 
right circumstances) as looking, precisely, red?' 
12 When McDowell discusses dispositionalism about the comic, in 'Projection and Truth in Ethics', 
he tries to make the circularity of the theory into a virtue, by arguing that it blocks a projectivist 
account of humour. He says, 'The suggestion is that there is no self-contained prior fact of our 
subjective lives that could enter into a projective account of the relevant way of thinking'-that is, 
no independently specifiable subjective response that we can be described as projecting onto the world 
(p. 6). We would argue that the same problem afflicts, not just a projectivist account of the comical, 
but our very perceptions of things as comical, as McDowell interprets hose perceptions. 
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when it looks red should be identified as a disposition, not to appear red, 
but rather to appear in a portion of the visual field having an intrinsic 
property that Peacocke calls red'. Let us call these portions of the visual 
field red' patches. We can then say that looking red, according to Peacocke, 
is looking disposed to be represented in red' patches under standard 
conditions-an appearance that can be accomplished by being represented 
in a red' patch under recognizably standard conditions, of course, but 
also in other ways as well, such as by being represented in an orange' 
patch when illuminated by a yellow-looking light. The upshot, in any 
case, is that objects often are as they look when they look red, because 
they both look and are just this: disposed to be represented inred' patches 
under standard conditions. 
Peacocke's qualified dispositionalism eliminates circular experiential 
contents because it says that appearing to have a colour property is 
appearing disposed to present appearances characterized, not in terms of 
that very property, but rather in terms of a different quality, a 'primed' 
colour. Peacocke can also account for the role of red in the experience of 
seeing a red after-image, because he can say that the experience consists 
in a red' patch represented, inthe content of one's experience, asa figment 
of one's eyes. 
Peacocke's qualified ispositionalism differs from pure dispositionalism 
in that it introduces a visual field modified by qualities that-to judge 
by their names, at least-constitute a species of colour. Peacocke thus 
abandons a significant feature of the theories that we have examined thus 
far. Those theories assume that visual experience involves colour only to 
the extent of representing it. They analyse an experience of red as an 
experience with the content hat something is red-an experience that 
refers to redness. Because the role of colour in experience is restricted by 
these theories to that of an element in the intentional content of experience, 
we shall call the theories intentionalist. 
Peacocke's theory is not intentionalist, because it says that visual 
experience involves colour (that is, primed colour) as a property inhering 
in the visual field, and not just as a property represented in the content 
of that experience. We have two points to make about Peacocke's anti- 
intentionalism. We shall first argue that Peacocke is right to abandon 
intentionalism and to introduce colours as intrinsic properties of the visual 
field. But we shall then argue that, having introduced such properties, 
Peacocke is wrong to remain a dispositionalist about the colours that visual 
experience attributes to external objects. Peacocke's modification of 
dispositionalism is unstable, we believe, in that it ultimately undermines 
dispositionalism altogether. 
The case against intentionalism 
Peacocke has argued elsewhere, and on independent grounds, for the need 
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to speak about a sensory field modified by intrinsic sensational qualities.13 
We should like to add some arguments of our own. 
Our first argument rests on the possibility, noted above, of seeing an 
after-image without illusion. Consider such an experience, in which an 
after-image appears to you as an after-image-say, as a red spot obscuring 
the face of a person who has just taken your photograph. Since you suffer 
no illusion about the nature of this spot, you do not see it as something 
actually existing in front of the photographer's face. In what sense, then, 
do you see it as occupying that location at all? The answer is that you see 
it as merely appearing in that location: you see it as a spot that appears 
in front of the photographer's face without actually being there. Now, in 
order for you to see the spot as appearing somewhere, itmust certainly 
appear there. Yet it must appear there without appearing actually to be 
there, since you are not under the illusion that the spot actually occupies 
the space in question. The after-image must therefore be described as 
appearing in a location without appearing to be in that location; and this 
description is not within the capacity of any intentionalist theory. An 
intentionalist theory will analyse the visual appearance of location as the 
attribution of location to something, in the intentional content of your 
visual experience. But the intentional content of your visual experience is 
that there is nothing at all between you and the photographer. 
The only way to describe the after-image as appearing in front of the 
photographer without appearing to be in front of the photographer is to 
talk about the location that it occupies in your visual field. In your visual 
field, we say, the after-image overlays the image of the photographer's 
face, but nothing is thereby represented as actually being over the 
photographer's face. The after-image is thus like a coffee-stain o a picture, 
a feature that occupies a location on the picture without representing 
anything as occupying any location. Similarly, an adequate description of 
the after-image requires reference to two kinds of location-location as 
an intrinsic property of features in the visual field, and location as 
represented by the resulting visual experience. 
One might think that this argument cannot be applied to the after- 
image's colour, since you may see the after-image not only as appearing 
red but also as actually being red. But then intentionalism will have trouble 
explaining what exactly your experience represents as being red, given 
that the experience is veridical. Your experience cannot represent some 
external object as being red, on pain of being illusory. And if it represents 
an image as being red, then its truth will entail that colour can enter into 
visual experience as an intrinsic property of images, which is precisely 
what intentionalism denies. Hence there would seem to be nothing that 
13 Sense and Content; Experience, Thought, and their Relations, Clarendon Press, Oxford, I983, 
ch. i. Other arguments are provided by Sydney Shoemaker in 'Qualities and Qualia: What's in the 
Mind?'. 
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the experience can veridically represent as being red, according to 
intentionalism. And if the experience represented something as merely 
appearing red, then our foregoing argument would once again apply. For 
how could you have a veridical experience that something appeared red 
unless something so appeared? And if something did so appear, it would 
have to appear to be red, according to intentionalism, which would be an 
illusion in the present case, unless images can be red.14 
There are other, more familiar cases that refute intentionalism in a 
similar way. These, too, are cases in which something is seen without 
being represented in the content of experience as intentionalism would 
require. If you press the side of one eyeball, you can see this line of type 
twice without seeing the page as bearing two identical ines of type. 
Indeed, you cannot even force the resulting experience into representing 
the existence of two lines, even if you try. Similarly, you can see nearby 
objects double by focusing on distant objects behind them, and yet you 
cannot get yourself to see the number of nearby objects as doubling. And 
by unfocusing your eyes, you can see objects blurrily without being able 
to see them as being blurry. None of these experiences can be adequately 
described solely in terms of their intentional content. Their description 
requires reference to areas of colour in a visual field, areas that split in 
two or become blurry without anything's being represented to you as 
doing so. 
The case against Peacocke's dispositionalism 
We therefore endorse Peacocke's decision to posit a visual field with 
intrinsic sensational qualities. What we question, however, ishis insistence 
that the colours of external objects are still seen as dispositions. We believe 
that once one posits a visual field bearing properties such as red', one is 
eventually forced to conclude that objects presented in red' areas of that 
field are seen as red' rather than as possessing some other, dispositional 
quality. 
The reason is that visual experience does not ordinarily distinguish 
between qualities of a 'field' representing objects and qualities of the 
objects represented. Visual experience is ordinarily naively realistic, in 
the sense that the qualities presented in it are represented as qualities of 
the external world. According to Peacocke, however, the aspects of visual 
experience in which external objects are represented have qualities-and, 
indeed, colour qualities-that are never attributed by that experience to 
14 Intentionalism cannot characterize the experience in question as being similar to, or representing 
itself as being similar to, the experience you have when you see redness as attaching to a material 
object. Such an experience would have a different content from the one you are now having, and so 
it would not be like your present experience in any respect that the intentionalist can identify. Of 
course, once we abandon intentionalism, wecan say that your present experience and the experience 
of seeing a red material object are alike in their intrinsic qualities. But such qualities are denied by 
intentionalism. 
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the objects themselves. Peacocke thus gets the phenomenology ofvisual 
experience wrong. 
Try to imagine what visual experience would be like if it conformed to 
Peacocke's model. The visual field would have the sensational qualities 
red', blue', green', and so on, and would represent various external 
objects; but it would not represent hose qualities as belonging to those 
objects. Where, then, would the qualities appear to reside? What would 
they appear to be qualities of? They would have to float free, as if detached 
from the objects being represented, so as not to appear as qualities of 
those objects. Or perhaps they would seem to lie on top of the objects, 
overlaying the objects' own colours-which would be seen, remember, as
different, dispositional qualities. The result, in any case, would be that 
visual experience was not naively realistic, but quite the reverse. A veil of 
colours-like Locke's veil of ideas-would seem to stand before or lie 
upon the scene being viewed. But one does not continually see this veil 
of colours; and so visual experience must not conform to Peacocke's model. 
The failure of Peacocke's model to fit the experience of colour can be 
seen most clearly, perhaps, in the fact that the model is a perfect fit for 
the experience of pain. When one pricks one's finger on a pin, pain appears 
in one's tactual 'field', but it is not perceived as a quality of the pin. 
Rather, the pin is perceived as having a disposition-namely, the 
disposition to cause pain, and hence to be presented in areas of the tactual 
field bearing the quality currently being felt. The ordinary way of 
describing the experience would be to say that by having an experience 
of pain one perceives the pin as disposed to cause pain. But this description 
can easily be transposed into Peacocke's notation, in which it would say 
that one perceives the pin as painful by perceiving it in a painful' patch. 
Peacocke's theory is thus ideally suited to describing the experience of 
pain. Yet the experience of pain is notoriously different from the experience 
of colour. Indeed, the difference between pain experience and colour 
experience has always been accepted as an uncontroversial datum for the 
discussion of secondary qualities. The difference is precisely that pain is 
never felt as a quality of its apparent cause, whereas colour usually is: the 
pain caused by the pin is felt as being in the finger, whereas the pin's 
silvery colour is seen as being in the pin. Hence Peacocke's model, which 
fits pain experience so well, cannot simultaneously fit colour experience. 
When applied to colour, that model would suggest hat the experience of 
seeing a rose contains both the flower's redness and the visual field's red'- 
ness, just as the experience of being pricked by a pin contains both the 
pin's painfulness and the finger's pain. 
One might respond that our objection to Peacocke is undermined by 
an example that we previously deployed against intentionalism. For we 
have already argued that seeing something blurrily involves a blurriness 
that is not attributed to what is seen. Have we not already admitted, then, 
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that visual experience contains qualities that it does not attribute to objects, 
and hence that it is not always naive? 
We have indeed admitted that visual experience is not always naive, 
but that admission is consistent with the claim that visual experience is 
naive most of the time, or in most respects. Seeing blurrily is, after all, 
unusual, in that it involves eeing, as it were, 'through' a blurry image to 
a visibly sharp-edged object. It is an experience in which the visual field 
becomes more salient than usual, precisely because its blurriness is not 
referred to the objects seen. Peacocke's theory does manage to improve 
on intentionalism by explaining how one can blurrily see an object as 
being sharp-edged. But Peacocke goes too far, by analysing all visual 
experience on the model of this unusual case. He says that every perception 
of colour has this dual structure, in which the colours that are attributed 
to objects are seen through colour qualities that are not attributed to them. 
According to Peacocke, then, the redness of external objects is always een 
through a haze of red'ness, just as the sharp edges of an object are 
sometimes seen through a blur. 
The Projectivist Account 
We have argued, first, that visual experience cannot be adequately 
described without reference to intrinsic sensational qualities of a visual 
field; and second, that intrinsic olour properties of the visual field are 
the properties that objects are seen as having when they look coloured. 
We have thus arrived at the traditional projectivist account of colour 
experience. The projection posited by this account has the result that the 
intentional content of visual experience represents external objects as 
possessing colour qualities that belong, in fact, only to regions of th-e 
visual field. By 'gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours 
borrowed from internal sentiment', as Hume puts it, the mind 'raises in 
a manner a new creation.15 
Talk of a visual field and its intrinsic qualities may seem to involve a 
commitment to the existence of mental particulars. But we regard the 
projectivist view of colour experience as potentially neutral on the 
metaphysics of mind. The visual field may or may not supervene on neural 
structures; itmay or may not be describable by means of adverbs modifying 
mental verbs rather than by substantives denoting mental items. All we 
claim is that, no matter how the metaphysical underpinnings of sense 
experience are ultimately arranged, they must support reference to colours 
as qualities of a visual field that are represented as inhering in external 
objects. 
15 David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1975, Appendix i. Of course, this passage is literally about the projection 
of value, not colour. But surely, Hume chose colour as his metaphor for value, in this context, because 
he regarded projectivism about colour as an intuitively natural view. 
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Pros and cons 
The projectivist account of colour experience is, in our opinion, the one 
that occurs naturally to anyone who learns the rudimentary facts about 
light and vision. It seemed obvious to Galileo, as it did to Newton and 
Locke as well.16 
The principle of charity as applied to visual experience 
Given the intuitive appeal that the projectivist account holds for anyone 
who knows about the nature of light and vision, the question arises why 
some philosophers go to such lengths in defence of alternative accounts. 
The reason, as we have suggested, isthat these philosophers are moved by 
a perceived requirement of charity in the interpretation f representational 
content. External objects do not actually have the colour qualities that 
projectivism interprets visual experience as attributing to them. The 
projectivist account thus interprets visual experience as having a content 
that would be systematically erroneous. And it therefore strikes ome as 
violating a basic principle of interpretation. 
In our opinion, however, applying a principle of charity in this way 
would be questionable, for two reasons. First, a principle of charity applies 
primarily to a language, or other representational system, taken as a whole; 
and so, when rightly understood, such a principle is perfectly consistent 
with the possibility that large regions of the language should rest on 
widespread and systematic error. Second, what a principle of charity 
recommends i , not that we should avoid attributing widespread error at 
all costs, but that we should avoid attributing inexplicable error. And the 
error that a Galilean view of colour entails is not inexplicable; it can be 
explained precisely as an error committed through projection-that is, 
through the misrepresentation of qualities that inhere in the visual field 
as inhering in the objects that are therein represented. 
We therefore think that the usual motives for resisting projectivism are 
misguided, on quite general grounds. Nevertheless, ome philosophers 
have criticized projectivism for being uncharitable to visual experience in 
rather specific ways; and we think that these more specific harges deserve 
to be answered. We devote the remainder of this section to three of these 
criticisms. 
16 Isaac Newton, Opticks, Dover Publications, New York, I979, Book I, part i, definition; John 
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1975, Book II, ch. viii. Jonathan Bennett has interpreted Locke as a dispositionalist about colour 
(Locke, Berkeley, Hume; Central Themes, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, ch. IV). But the textual 
evidence is overwhelming that Locke believed colour experience to be guilty of an error, and a 
projectivist error, at that. Locke was a dispositionalist, inour opinion, only about the properties of 
objects that actually cause colour experience, not about the properties that such experience represents 
objects as having. 
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Colours as visibilia 
One argument in this vein comes from the dispositionalists. They contend 
that failing to see colours as dispositions to look coloured would entail 
failing to see them as essentially connected with vision, as visibilia.17 But 
nothing can be seen as a colour without being seen as essentially connected 
with vision, the dispositionalists continue, and so colours cannot possibly 
be misrepresented in visual experience. 
This version of the argument from charity relies on the assumption 
that the only way to see colours as essentially connected with vision is to 
see them as dispositions to cause visual perceptions. We reply that colours 
can be seen as essentially connected with vision without being seen as 
dispositions at all. In particular, they can be seen as essentially connected 
with vision if they are seen as the qualities directly presented in visual 
experience, arrayed on the visual field. The experience of seeing red is 
unmistakably an experience of a quality that could not be experienced 
other than visually. Consequently, red is seen as essentially visual without 
being seen as a disposition to cause visual perceptions. 
A Berkeleyan objection 
Another version of the argument from charity begins with the premiss 
that qualities of the visual field cannot be imagined except as being seen, 
and hence that they cannot be imagined as intrinsic and categorical 
qualities of material objects-qualities belonging to the objects in them- 
selves, whether they are seen or not. This premiss is taken to imply that 
visual experience cannot possibly commit he error of representing colour 
qualia to be intrinsic and categorical qualities of objects, as projectivism 
charges, simply because it cannot represent the unimaginable.18 
Our reply to this argument is that its premiss is false. The colour 
qualities that modify the visual field can indeed be imagined as unseen. 
Of course, one cannot -imagine a colour as unseen while instantiated in 
the visual field itself, since to imagine a quality as in the visual field is to 
imagine that it is seen. But one can imagine a colour as instantiated 
elsewhere without being seen-by imagining, for example, an ordinary 
red-rubber ball, whose surface is red not only on the visible, near side 
but also on the unseen, far side. 
What exponents of the present objection are pointing out, of course, is 
that one cannot imagine the unseen side of the ball as red by means of a 
mental image whose features include a red area corresDonding tothat side 
17 See McDowell, 'Values and Secondary Qualities', pp. 113-15. 
18 See Evans, 'Things Without he Mind', pp. 99-IOO. Berkeley carried this argument farther, by 
claiming that unperceived qualities, being unimaginable, were also inconceivable and hence impossible. 
Berkeley's willingness to equate imagination with conception was due to his theory of ideas, which 
equated concepts with mental pictures. 
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of the ball. Here they may be correct.19 To form an image containing a 
coloured area corresponding to the unseen side of the ball would be to 
imagine seeing it, and hence not to imagine it as unseen, after all. But 
one's imagination is not confined to representing things by means of 
corresponding features in one's mental image. If it were, then one would 
be unable to imagine any object as being both opaque and three- 
dimensional; one would be reduced to imagining the world as a maze of 
backless faqades, all artfully turned in one's direction. In actuality, one 
imagines the world as comprising objects in the round, whose unseen 
sides are represented in one's image indirectly and, so to speak, by 
implication. One can therefore imagine unseen colours, despite limitations 
on how one's imagination can represent them. 
Visual experience has the same representational c pacity, despite similar 
limitations. That is, although one cannot visually catch colours in the act 
of being unseen, one nevertheless ees the world as containing unseen 
colours-on the far sides of objects, in areas obscured by shadow, and so 
on. Just as one sees one's fellow human beings as having hair at the back, 
skin up their sleeves, and eyeballs even when they blink, so one sees them 
as possessing these unseen features in their usual colours. Thus, one has 
no trouble seeing colours as intrinsic and categorical properties that exist 
even when unseen. 
Can experience commit category errors? 
A third version of the argument from charity alleges that according to 
projectivism, visual experience commits not just a mistake but a category 
mistake, by representing external, material objects as having properties 
that can occur only within the mental realm.20 Such a mistake is thought 
too gross for visual experience to commit. 
It is not clear whether it is a necessary or merely contingent fact that 
external objects do not possess the sorts of property we understand colours 
to be; hence, it is not clear whether the mistake projectivism attributes to 
visual experience is categorial or merely systematic. But even if it were a 
category mistake, why should this necessarily be considered a difficulty 
for projectivism? 
The assumption underlying the objection is that it is somehow extremely 
difficult to see how experience could commit a category mistake. But as 
the following remark of Wittgenstein suggests, just the opposite seems 
true. 
Let us imagine the following: The surfaces of the things around us (stones, plants, 
etc.) have patches and regions which produce pain in our skin when we touch 
19 We grant this point for the sake of argument; but we think that it, too, underestimates the 
representational powers of the imagination. For surely one can form a mental image that contains a
'cut-away' view, showing how the far side of the ball looks while implying that it is, in reality, unseen. 
20 See Shoemaker, 'Qualities and Qualia: What's In The Mind?', p. io. 
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them. (Perhaps through the chemical composition fthese surfaces. But we need 
not know that.) In this case we should speak of pain-patches just as at present 
we speak of red patches.21 
In the normal experience of pain, pain is not perceived as a quality of its 
cause. As Wittgenstein remarks, however, this seems to be thanks only to 
the fact that the normal causes of pain constitute such a heterogeneous 
class. Were pain to be caused solely, say, by certain specific patches on 
the surfaces of plants, we might well experience pain as being in the plant, 
much as we now experience its colour. Far from being unimaginable, 
then, it would seem that nothing but a purely contingent fact about our 
experience of pain stands between us and a category mistake just like the 
one that projectivism portrays us as committing about colour. 
Interpreting Colour Discourse 
Thus far we have discussed colour concepts as they are exercised in the 
representational content of colour experience. Let us turn, somewhat more 
briefly, to the content of ordinary discourse about colour. 
We assume that ordinary discourse about colour reports the contents 
of visual experience. The most plausible hypothesis about what someone 
means when he calls something red, in an everyday context, is that he is 
reporting what his eyes tell him. And according to our account, what his 
eyes tell him is that the thing has a particular visual quality, a quality that 
does not actually inhere in external objects but is a quality of his visual 
field. We therefore conclude that when someone calls something red, in 
an everyday context, he is asserting a falsehood. Indeed, our account of 
colour experience, when joined with the plausible hypothesis that colour 
discourse reports the contents of colour experience, yields the consequence 
that all statements attributing colours to external objects are false. 
One would be justified in wondering how we can accept this consequence, 
for two related reasons. First, we will clearly want to retain a distinction 
between 'correct' and 'incorrect' colour judgements, distinguishing be- 
tween the judgement hat a fire-hydrant is blue and the judgement hat 
it is red. And it seems a serious question what point we error theorists 
could see in such a distinction. Second, it seems perfectly obvious that 
colour discourse will continue to play an indispensable role in our everyday 
cognitive transactions. Yet how are we error theorists to explain this 
indispensability, consistently with our claim that the discourse in question 
is systematically false? We shall begin with the second question. 
The point of colour-talk 
Consider one of the many harmless falsehoods that we tolerate in everyday 
discourse: the statement that the sun rises. When someone says that the 
21 Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1974, section 312. We do not necessarily claim 
that the use to which we should like to put this passage coincides with Wittgenstein's. 
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sun rises, his remark has the same content as the visual experience that 
one has when watching the horizon at an appropriately early hour. That 
is, the sun actually looks like it is moving, and that the sun moves in this 
manner is what most people mean when talking about sunrise. So 
interpreted, of course, talk about sunrise is systematically false. When 
someone says that the sun rises, he is wrong; and he usually knows that 
he is wrong, but he says it anyway. Why? 
When one understands why talk about sunrise is false, one also 
understands that its falsity makes no difference in everyday life. We do 
not mean that nothing in everyday life would, in fact, be different ifthe 
sun revolved around the earth, as it seems to. No doubt, the tides and 
the phases of the moon and various other phenomena would be other than 
they actually are. But those differences are not missed by the ordinary 
person, who does not know and has no reason to consider precisely how 
the tides and phases of the moon are generated. Consequently, someone 
who has a normal background of beliefs will find no evidence in everyday 
life to controvert his belief that the sun revolves around the earth. That 
belief will not mislead him about any of the phenomena he normally 
encounters; and it will in fact give him correct guidance about many such 
phenomena. His judgements about the time of day, the weather, the best 
placement of crops, the location of glare and of shadows at noon, will all 
be correct despite being derived from premisses about a stationary earth 
and a revolving sun. Indeed, he is likely to derive more true conclusions 
from his belief in a revolving sun than he would from a belief in a rotating 
earth, for the simple reason that the consequences for earthlings of the 
former state of affairs are easier to visualize than those of the latter, even 
though those consequences would be the same, for everyday purposes. 
Talking about horizon-fall rather than sunrise would thus be downright 
misleading, even though it would be more truthful. Only an undue 
fascination with the truth could lead someone to reform ordinary discourse 
about the sun. 
Talk about colours is just like talk about sunrise in these respects. That 
is, life goes on as if objects are coloured in the way that they appear to 
be. Experience refutes few if any of the conclusions derived from beliefs 
about objects' colours; and many true conclusions are derived from such 
beliefs. Most of those true conclusions, of course, are about how objects 
will look to various people under various circumstances. And these 
conclusions are extremely useful in everyday life, since one's ability to 
communicate with others and with one's future selves about the external 
world depends on the ability to describe how various parts of that world 
appear. The point is that such conclusions are more easily and more 
reliably drawn from the familiar false picture of colours than they would 
be-by the ordinary person, at least-from the true picture of wavelengths 
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and spectral-reflectance curves. Why, then, should one replace such a 
useful false picture with a true but misleading one? 
Correct vs. incorrect colour-talk 
The case of colour differs from that of sunrise in one important respect. 
The sun never seems to do anything but move in a regular arc across the 
heavens, whereas objects often seem to have different colours in different 
circumstances. The ordinary speaker therefore finds himself drawing a
distinction between the colours that objects really have and the colours 
that they only seem to have on some occasions. How can we countenance 
this distinction between real and illusory colours, given that our theory 
brands all colours as illusory?22 
The answer is that classifying an object by the colour that it appears 
to have under so-called standard conditions is the most reliable and most 
informative way of classifying it, for the purposes of drawing useful 
conclusions about how the object will appear under conditions of any 
kind. Obviously, classifying an object by how it appears in the dark is not 
at all informative, since all objects appear equally black in the dark, even 
though they appear to have different colours in the light. Hence one can 
extrapolate an object's appearance in the dark from its appearance in the 
light, but not vice versa. The same is true-though to a lesser degree, of 
course-for other non-standard conditions. For instance, distance tends 
to lend a similar appearance to objects that look different a close range; 
coloured light tends to lend a similar appearance to objects that look 
different in daylight; and so on. The common-sense calculus of colour 
addition and subtraction therefore nables one to infer an object's 
appearance under non-standard conditions from its appearance under 
standard conditions, but not its appearance under standard conditions 
from that under non-standard conditions. That is why one set of conditions, 
and the accompanying colour-illusion, are privileged in everyday life. 
There are notable xceptions to our claim about the varying informative- 
ness of various colour appearances. But these exceptions actually support 
our explanation of why particular colour-illusions are privileged in ordinary 
22 We should point out that a similar question will confront those who adopt a dispositionalist 
interpretation f colour discourse. For according to dispositionalism, the colours of objects are their 
dispositions to present he appearance of colour; and objects are disposed to present he appearance 
of different colours under different circumstances. Corresponding toevery colour that an object ever 
appears or would appear to have, there is a disposition of the object to give that appearance under 
the circumstances then prevailing. Now, dispositionalism denominates only one of these innumerable 
dispositions as the object's real colour, and it does so by defining the object's colour to be that 
disposition which is manifested under conditions pecified as standard. But surely, dispositionalism 
should have to justify its selection of dispositions-or, what amounts to the same thing, its selection 
of standard conditions. For if colour is nothing but a disposition to produce colour appearances, one 
wants to know why a particular disposition to produce colour appearances hould be privileged over 
other such dispositions. And this is, in effect, the same question as why one colour-illusion should 
be privileged over other colour-illusions, given the assumption that all colours are illusory. 
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discourse, because consideration of them leads the ordinary speaker to 
reconsider the distinction between true and illusory colour. 
Some pairs of objects that appear to have the same colour in daylight- 
say, green-can appear to have different colours under incandescent 
lighting, where one may appear green and the other brown.23 In these 
cases, how an object appears in daylight is not an indication of how it will 
appear under other less standard conditions. 
Yet in these cases, one begins to wonder whether the object has a 'true' 
or standard colour at all. If an object's apparent colour does not vary, 
from one set of conditions to the next, in the same way as the apparent 
colour of objects that share its apparent colour in daylight, then one is 
tempted to say that the object does not have any one colour at all. Consider 
the object that looks green in daylight but brown in incandescent light, 
where most other objects that look green in daylight still look green. Is 
the object really green? really brown? Does it have any single 'real' colour 
at all?4 Here intuitions diverge and ultimately give out. The reason, we 
think, is precisely that the common-sense notion of an object's real colour 
presupposes that it is the one apparent colour from which all its other 
apparent colours can be extrapolated, by fairly familiar ules of colour 
mixing. When that assumption is threatened, so is the notion of real 
colour. 
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23 This phenomenon is called metamerism. See C. L. Hardin, Color for Philosophers; Unweaving 
the Rainbow, Hackett, Indianapolis, I988, pp. 28, 45 ff. 
24 People who spend much time considering these cases have been known to give up the notion 
of true colour entirely. We once asked a scientist who performs research on colour vision why people 
think that most opaque objects have a real colour. His answer was, 'They do? How odd.' 
